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Prospect Theory, Analysts’ Forecasts, and Stock Returns 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper documents how prospect theory can be used to explain stock returns and 
analysts’ forecast behavior. Positive earnings surprises are associated with increases in abnormal 
returns but negative earnings surprises have only a limited negative impact on returns. We find 
that analysts display asymmetric behavior towards positive and negative earnings growth. 
Analysts’ forecasts are found to be accurate during periods of positive earnings growth, but 
overly optimistic during periods of negative earnings growth. Our findings have implications for 
the structuring of investment products, as well as the role of market timing in their introduction.  
 
JEL Classification: G14; G34; O53 
Keywords: Behavioral finance; Prospect theory; Analyst forecasts; Earnings growth; Earnings 
surprise.
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Prospect Theory, Analyst Forecasts, and Stock Returns 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 This paper studies how analysts and investors react to positive and negative events. We 
analyze the difference in forecast errors that analysts make during both positive and negative 
earnings growth periods and document the role that investor sentiment plays in the earnings 
expectation process. Following Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory, we analyze the 
influence of positive and negative earnings surprises. They have demonstrated how behavioral 
influences prevent investors from making rational choices and propose a value function whereby 
the disutility of a loss is much greater than the utility of a gain of the same magnitude.  
A major contribution of this paper is the use of prospect theory to explain asymmetric 
stock market reactions resulting from an earnings surprise. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) find 
that investors suffer a much greater disutility during a loss and are reluctant to realize their losses 
during negative earnings surprise. Although Levis and Liodakis (2001) find that earnings 
surprise has an asymmetric impact on growth stocks and value stocks, they do not compare the 
asymmetric impact of positive and negative earnings surprise on abnormal stock returns, nor link 
such asymmetric abnormal returns to prospect theory.  
We find that stock returns react strongly to positive earnings surprise, but negative 
earnings surprise has no significant impact on returns, implying the presence of investor loss 
aversion where they are reluctant to realize their losses. We also find that, while analysts are 
accurate during positive earnings growth, their forecasts are highly optimistic during negative 
earnings growth. The level of positive forecast error increases as the absolute amount of negative 
earnings growth increases. While Amir and Ganzach (1998) and Ashiya (2002) found that 
analysts are over-optimistic when they revise their forecasts downwards, and Hofstedt (1972) 
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reported that forecasters are reluctant to predict negative earnings growth, prior research did not 
examine the relationship between forecast error and earnings growth. We document that large, 
overly optimistic forecast errors during periods of negative earnings growth are associated with 
the presence of positive investor sentiment.  
Our findings have important implications. First, we provide an empirical test of prospect 
theory from the stock market effects of earnings announcements. Second, capital-guaranteed 
investment products may be popular with investors due to investor loss aversion. Third, investor 
loss aversion indicates that there is usually sufficient time to cut losses after the announcement of 
a negative event. Fourth, launching new financial products during times of positive sentiment is 
likely to induce a positive response due to over-optimism, even if the yield or earnings growth 
from the security could be below expectations.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents our research methodology and 
hypotheses. The findings are reported in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Utility theory and prospect theory share some similarities. Both recognize that utility 
from wealth is distinct from the actual monetary value of wealth. Hence, they analyze the 
satisfaction that a person would derive from his current wealth or a change in his wealth. Both 
theories also predict that investors are risk averse in gains, i.e., increases in wealth have 
diminishing marginal utility.  However, they have three main differences. First, utility theory 
evaluates utility from the final states of wealth, which includes wealth from the prospect and 
other existing assets, whereas prospect theory evaluates the value of a prospect from a change in 
wealth due to a prospect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). Second, utility theory uses stated 
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probabilities to find the expected utility, where expected utility is the summation of utilities from 
each possible outcome, weighted by the probability of occurrence for each potential outcome. 
Prospect theory, however, uses decision weights in its value function. The decision weighting 
function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1979) has the decision weights lower than the 
states’ probabilities, except for extreme outcomes. Extremely low probability events beyond a 
certain benchmark are assigned a zero probability of occurrence, whereas those with an 
extremely high probability of occurrence are treated with certainty. Third, utility theory assumes 
that investors are either risk-averse, risk neutral or risk seeking, but the same person cannot 
simultaneously exhibit risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk-seeking characteristics. On the other 
hand, prospect theory predicts that investors would be risk averse in gains and risk seeking in 
losses, regardless of their level of wealth. The value function of prospect theory (see Figure 1) 
has a gentle slope for gains and a much steeper slope for losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). 
This means that investors would suffer a much greater disutility in a loss than they would enjoy 
utility from a gain of the same absolute magnitude. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory offers a model to address some of the 
limitations of utility theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1991, and 1992) further expand 
prospect theory to the framing of human decisions into gains or losses, the influence of prospect 
theory in investment decisions, and human choice among risky decisions. Olsen (1997) finds that 
investment decisions by professional investment managers conform to prospect theory. Prospect 
theory is developed from psychological research on preference reversal. Tversky, Slovic, and 
Kahneman (1990), Mowen and Gentry (1980), and Tversky and Thaler (1990) find that investors 
prefer a high probability, low pay-off bet over a low probability, high pay-off one, but would set 
a higher price for the low probability, high pay-off bet when they are asked to sell the bet.  
Even though prospect theory presents an opportunity to address some of the economic 
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issues not covered by utility theory, it has so far remained largely hypothetical. Although Shefrin 
and Statman (1985) found investor loss aversion from mutual funds redemption data, there has 
thus far been no research on prospect theory using stock returns. The exact values and 
relationships in both the value and weighting functions of prospect theory remain unknown. We 
classify observations into positive and negative events in the evaluation of prospect theory.  
Analysts’ earnings forecasts can be influenced by factors other than rational analysis, as 
noted by Dechow and Sloan (1997), Amir and Ganzach (1998), Espahbodi, Dugar, and 
Tehranian (2001), Allen, Cho and Jung (1997), and Ang and Ma (2001), among others. Amir and 
Ganzach (1998) find that analysts overreact to positive forecasts but under-react to negative 
ones. Ashiya (2002) presents evidence that Japanese institutional economists are pessimistic 
when they revise their forecast upwards, but are optimistic when they revise their forecast 
downwards. Hofstedt (1972) reports an unwillingness of investors to predict negative earnings 
growth. While prior research shows that there is asymmetry in the quantum of forecast errors, 
they do not examine the relationship between forecast errors and earnings growth. In this paper, 
we build on these prior studies by examining how positive and negative earnings surprises 
influence analysts’ forecast errors. 
Apart from behavioral influences, agency problems also cause analysts’ forecasts to 
diverge from actual earnings per share. Loffler (1998) argues that analysts distort their earnings 
estimates when they believe that their clients had misconceived the true precision of their 
forecasts. Prior research by Conroy, Harris and Park (1998), Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001), and 
Levis and Liodakis (2001) find that earnings surprise has an impact on stock returns. 
Specifically, Levis and Liodakis (2001) show that stock returns from positive earnings surprises 
for value stocks are higher than those from positive earnings surprises for other types of stocks. 
On the other hand, they report that negative earnings surprises have a more negative impact on 
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growth stocks, but only a minor impact on value stocks. Moreover, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
find that ‘loser’ portfolios outperform ‘winner’ portfolios by about 25% over 36 months. 
 
3. DATA  
The data in this study consists of 2,084 companies listed on either the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and covered by at least one analyst 
from July 1987 to June 2000. The observation period is meant to coincide with the availability of 
investor sentiment data from the weekly American Association of Individual Investors’ (AAII) 
sentiment survey, which has been conducted since July 1987. Each observation represents data 
from one company in each quarterly period. Since companies announce their quarterly earnings 
in different months, the quarterly data of the companies may not be from the same months.  
I/B/E/S provides data of the last reported actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS), the 
median forecast quarterly EPS, and the number of analysts on a monthly basis. The signed 
forecast error in equation (1) measures the deviation of the median analysts’ forecast of quarterly 
EPS from the actual figure, normalized by the actual earnings that are announced in the 
following quarter.1 The absolute value of the actual quarterly EPS is used in the denominator in 
order to accurately compute the sign of the forecast error. This computation method follows that 
used by Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) and Allen, Cho, and Jung (1997). 
( )
 A 
A -  F   FE
T i, 
 Ti,  1-T i,
 T i, =  (1) 
where FEi,T is the forecast error for the ith stock in quarter T, Fi,T-1 is the median forecasted EPS 
                                                          
1 Alternatives to our computation of the forecast error include that by Ang and Ma (2001), where the denominator of 
the algorithm is the stock price: 
Ti,
Ti,1Ti,
P
AF −− . Espahbodi, Dugar, and Tehranian (2000) used a similar computation, 
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for the ith stock in quarter T-1, and Ai,T is the actual quarterly EPS for the ith stock in quarter T.  
The computation of earnings growth (EG), which captures the percentage change in 
actual quarterly EPS, is shown in equation (2).  
1Ti,
1Ti,Ti,
Ti, A
)A(A
EG
−
−−=  (2) 
where Ai,T and Ai,T-1 represent actual quarterly EPS for the ith stock in quarter T and T-1, 
respectively. 
 In equation (3), earnings surprise (ES) is captured by the deviation of the actual quarterly 
EPS from the median forecasted quarterly EPS in the previous month. Following Conroy, Harris, 
and Park (1998), and Levis and Liodakis (2001), the absolute value of the forecasted EPS is used 
in the denominator so that a negative forecasted EPS would be appropriately reflected. 
( )
 F 
F - A    ES
1- ti, 
 1-ti,  T i,
 T i, =  (3) 
where Ai,T is the actual quarterly EPS for the ith stock in quarter T, and Fi,t-1 is the median 
forecasted quarterly EPS for the ith stock one month before the announcement of the actual 
quarterly EPS. 
 Tversky and Kahneman (1979) have stated that changes in welfare, rather than final 
states of welfare, are carriers of value. As such, monthly changes in the percentage of bullish 
investors from the AAII survey are used as a proxy for market sentiment. This measure is also 
used by Fisher and Statman (2000) in their study of the correlation between sentiment and stock 
returns. For our purposes, we convert the weekly percentage of bullish investors into monthly 
observations and represent sentiment in month t as St:   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ti,
Ti,Ti,
P
FA − . The advantage of equation (1) is that the stock price will not have a negative value, thus ensuring that the 
forecast error has the correct sign. 
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1t
1tt
t %Bull
)%Bull(%BullS
−
−−=  (4) 
where %Bullt and %Bullt-1 represent the percentage of bullish respondents out of total 
respondents in the AAII survey data at month t and t-1, respectively.  
 We obtain the daily dividend-adjusted returns for all stocks and the market index from 
the CRSP database. The observations are then classified into either a positive growth ( 0EG ≥ ) 
or a negative growth (EG < 0) group. They are also classified into a positive earnings surprise 
( 0ES≥ ) and a negative earnings surprise (ES < 0) group. Tversky and Kahneman (1979) have 
stated that investors tend to perceive outcomes as gains or losses relative to a neutral reference 
point. Hence, a positive earnings surprise would be perceived as a gain, whereas a negative 
earnings surprise is perceived as a loss. 
We generate two separate data sets, one relating to the forecast error and the other to the 
earnings surprise, as their forecasted quarterly EPS are from different months. After eliminating 
the top one percentile and the bottom one percentile, there are 45,488 observations in the forecast 
error data set, with 27,891 in the positive growth group, and 17,597 in the negative growth 
group. In the earnings surprise data set, there remains 50,150 observations, with 33,479 in the 
positive earnings surprise group and 16,671 in the negative earnings surprise group.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the forecast error data set. In the positive growth 
group, quarterly earnings grew 59.89% on average from the previous quarter whereas, in the 
negative growth group, quarterly earnings declined 44.65%. Panel A in Table 1 shows that the 
mean forecast error for all observations is positive (16.37%) indicating over-optimism in 
analysts’ forecasts. The findings concur with those of Dechow and Sloan (1997), Espahbodi, 
Dugar, and Tehranian (2001), and Ang and Ma (2001) that analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
generally over-optimistic. We note in Panel B that, when earnings growth is positive, analysts 
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are more accurate with their forecasts with a small forecast error (2.92%). In Panel C, the 
forecast error is large (37.69%) in the negative growth group, indicating that analysts slightly 
over-estimate a company’s EPS when earnings growth is positive, but would greatly over-
estimate it when earnings decline. This observation is confirmed by the significant t-statistic for 
the mean difference between the positive and negative earnings growth groups reported in Panel 
D. The results show that analysts are overly optimistic during periods of negative earnings 
growth. The findings are consistent with those of Ashiya (2002) and Hofstedt (1972) that 
analysts show a greater reluctance in forecasting negative, rather than positive, earnings growth. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings surprise data set. In Panel A, 
earnings surprise is negative (-1.82%), indicating that analysts over-estimate the actual EPS in 
the month prior to the earnings announcement. From Panel B and C, we find that the mean of a 
positive earnings surprise of 14.30% is lower than the absolute mean of a negative earnings 
surprise of -34.18%. This indicates that analysts over-estimate actual EPS by a greater margin 
than they would under-estimate actual EPS. Even though the forecasted EPS between the 
positive and negative earnings surprise groups is not significantly different from each other, the 
magnitude of the negative earnings surprise is significantly greater than that of the positive 
earnings surprise (Panel D). This implies that analysts on average are overly optimistic when 
making their forecasts. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 Prior research by Amir and Ganzach (1998), Ashiya (2002), and Hofstedt (1972) found 
asymmetry in the quantum of forecast errors. Analysts show reluctance in forecasting a negative 
event, such as negative earnings growth, or making large downward forecast revisions. We are 
interested in finding out whether analysts are equally accurate in forecasting positive and 
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negative earnings growth, and the impact of positive and negative earnings growth on forecast 
error. We examine how sentiment influences forecast error during both positive and negative 
earnings growth periods by running equation (5) separately for the positive and negative growth 
groups, with the number of analysts as a control variable.  
ti,31-t2ti,10ti, NbSbEGbbFE +++=  (5) 
where Ni,t represents the number of analysts covering the ith stock at time t and the other 
variables are as previously defined. b0, b1, b2, and b3 are the coefficient estimates. 
 If analysts are less willing to forecast negative earnings growth than they would positive 
earnings growth, they would make greater forecast errors during periods of negative earnings 
growth than during positive ones. Thus, we expect the earnings growth coefficient in the 
negative growth group to be larger in absolute term than that in the positive growth group. We 
conduct an event study to ascertain whether there are significant abnormal returns on the date of 
the announcement of actual EPS where the date of earnings announcement is represented by day 
0. We examine the abnormal returns 15 days before and 15 days after the announcement date. Of 
interest is whether the absolute abnormal returns are different during positive earnings surprise 
and negative earnings surprise.  
Daily abnormal returns are derived from the deviations from the single factor market 
model, as illustrated in equation (6). iαˆ  and iβˆ  are estimated from the ordinary least squares 
regressions of stock returns against the equally weighted market index for each event period. The 
estimation period used is 245 days prior to the earnings announcement date to 46 days before the 
earnings announcement date. 
)rβˆαˆ(rAR dm,iidi,di, +−=  (6) 
where ARi,d represents the abnormal returns for the ith stock on day d; ri,d is the rate of returns 
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for the ith stock; rm,d is the rate of returns for the equally weighted market index; iαˆ  and iβˆ  are 
OLS estimates of αi and βi of the single factor market model, where βi measures the sensitivity 
of returns for the ith stock to changes in returns on the market index. 
 The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over a specific window period around the 
announcement date are measured by:  
∑=
=
= 2
1
dd
dd
di,i21 AR)d,CAR(d  (7) 
where CAR(d1,d2)i represents the CAR over the period (d1, d2) for the ith stock. Following Patell 
(1976), the test statistic for the CAR is:  
( )
( )
∑
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
=










−
−++−
−
−
+−=
2
1
2
1
eD
bD
21
d
dt
d
k
2
mmk
2
mmd
ii
T
Tk
2
ik
2
di,
i
i
n
1i 21
i
d,d
RR
RR
d
11
2d
AR
AR
4d
2d
1)d(d
1
n
1Z
d
 (8) 
where i ddZ 21,  represents the Z-statistic for the null hypothesis that CAR(di,d2) = 0; ARi,d 
represents abnormal returns for the ith stock on day d; Rmd represents the market returns; mR is 
the mean market return over the estimation period; and d1 and d2 represent the start and end days 
of the accumulation period, respectively. 
 Levis and Liodakis (2001) found that positive earnings surprise causes higher stock 
returns for value stocks than for growth stocks, but has a greater negative impact on the returns 
of growth stocks than value stocks. However, they did not examine how the asymmetric impact 
of earnings surprise is influenced by prospect theory. The two-day cumulative abnormal returns 
used in this regression are the result generated from the earlier event study. The two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of abnormal returns on the earnings 
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announcement date and one day after. A two-day announcement CAR is used to examine the 
short-term price impact of an earnings surprise.  
i4
2
i3i2i10i Nb)(ESbESbEGbbCAR(0,1) ++++=   (9) 
where CAR(0,1) represents the two-day CAR in reaction to the EPS announcement; EG is the 
earnings growth; ES is the earnings surprise; N is the number of analysts for the ith stock; and 
the bi’s are the coefficient estimates of the regression. We expect a positive earnings surprise to 
increase abnormal returns and a negative earnings surprise to decrease abnormal returns. 
However, since investors are expected to suffer a greater disutility during a loss, the earnings 
surprise coefficient is expected to be larger in the positive surprise group than in the negative 
surprise group. The square of ES is included to capture a possible non-linear relation. 
 
5. RESULTS  
On average, the higher the earnings growth, the lower the forecast error (Table 3, Panel 
A).2 Analysts act differently during positive and negative earnings growth. Table 3 shows that 
earnings growth has a significant impact on the forecast error in the negative growth group 
(Panel C), but not in the positive growth group (Panel B). The results indicate that, during times 
when the company’s EPS is growing, analysts are quite accurate in their forecasts of the actual 
EPS. The positive intercept (0.0289) in the positive growth group when forecast error is 
regressed on earnings growth indicates that analysts slightly over-estimate earnings during 
positive earnings growth. This is consistent with the summary statistics of Table 1, which show 
that the mean forecast error is small (2.92%). In Panel B of Table 3, earnings growth has no 
                                                          
2 We have also performed the time series-cross sectional panel regressions assuming both fixed and random effects. 
The results are found to be qualitatively similar and conclusions are not different from those of the pooled 
regressions. As such, due to space constraints, we report only the results for the pooled regressions. 
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significant effect on forecast error in the positive growth group, implying that analysts’ forecasts 
are slightly over-optimistic and that the level of over-optimism remains at 2.92% as earnings 
growth increases. The results show that analysts’ forecasts are quite accurate and consistent 
during periods of positive earnings growth. On the other hand, in times of declining EPS, they 
are highly over-optimistic and tend to over-estimate it. Panel C of Table 3 shows a significant 
negative coefficient (-0.5698) for earnings growth in the negative growth group. In contrast, 
Panel C of Table 1 shows the mean forecast error in this group to be large and positive (37.69%), 
indicating that analysts over-estimate EPS during times of negative earnings growth. We note 
that the magnitude of over-estimation increases with the rate of earnings decline. These results 
support those of Amir and Ganzach (1998), Ashiya (2002), and Hofstedt (1972). We observe an 
asymmetry in the impact of earnings growth on forecast errors whereby an increase in positive 
earnings growth does not result in any increase in the level of over-optimism. It appears, 
therefore, that analysts are either unable or reluctant to forecast a decline in earnings. 
Although we do not claim that prospect theory has led to analysts’ forecast errors, the 
asymmetry in the impact of positive and negative earnings growth on forecast errors bears 
similarity to the value function of prospect theory, where gains and losses have an asymmetric 
impact on the value of a prospect. It is worth noting that Tversky and Kahneman (1986) found 
that investors typically frame a decision problem into gains and losses. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) further showed that the removal or a lack of monetary incentives does not influence or 
alter the outcomes of prospect theory. Since investors have a loss aversion according to the 
predictions of prospect theory, analysts would avoid making pessimistic forecasts if their 
incentives are tied to investor trading activity. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between actual 
EPS, forecasted EPS, and earnings growth. As positive earnings growth increases (from zero), 
analysts are quite accurate with their forecasts, and display only a small and consistent level of 
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over-optimism. As it decreases (from zero), the forecasted EPS increasingly outstrips the actual 
EPS. Analysts increasingly over-estimate EPS as rate of negative earnings growth increases.  
Analyst forecasts are influenced by market sentiment. Panel A of Table 3 shows that 
sentiment has a significant positive impact on analysts’ forecast errors. However, sentiment 
impacts forecast errors primarily during negative earnings growth (Panel C), but not during 
positive earnings growth (Panel B). When a company is experiencing negative earnings growth, 
strong sentiment could cause analysts to be overly optimistic in their forecasts. A decline in 
sentiment causes analysts to become more realistic in their over-optimistic earnings forecasts, 
resulting in a reduction of a positive bias or a negative forecast error. The asymmetric impact of 
sentiment on forecast error shows that strong sentiment during negative earnings growth can lead 
to analysts making positive forecast errors. 
The presence of more analysts reduces forecast errors (Table 3). This is true for both the 
positive and negative growth groups. As the number of analysts following a company increases, 
more scrutiny is placed on its financial performance. The mean analysts’ forecast becomes more 
accurate. Moreover, the impact of the number of analysts in reducing the forecast error is greater 
during times of negative earnings growth than during positive earnings growth. 
Table 4 and Figure 3 present the event study results. In both the positive earnings growth 
and earnings surprise groups, the announcement effect of EPS is positive and significant at the 
0.1% level on day -2, continuing to day 1 (Panel A). The corresponding two-day CAR over the 
period [0, 1] is also positive and significant (Panel B). On the other hand, during periods of 
negative earnings growth and earnings surprise, the announcement effect is negatively 
significant. In terms of economic value, during times of positive (negative) growth, investors 
earn a significant announcement day return of 0.45% (-0.13%) but, when faced with a positive 
(negative) earnings surprise, they earn a significant announcement day return of 0.60% (-0.55%). 
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It is worthy to note that, in Figure 3, Chart A and B, and Chart C and D, are not symmetrical to 
each other.  These results concur with our expectations and are consistent with those of prior 
studies.  
Table 5 shows the results of the regression of the two-day CAR on earnings growth, 
earnings surprise, and the number of analysts. In Panel A, we see that announcements of EPS 
during periods of earnings growth and earnings surprise as a whole have a positive impact on the 
two-day CAR. However, on average, the number of analysts following a company does not seem 
to matter.  There is a possibility that the relations are non-linear, judging by the significant 
coefficient for the square of earnings surprise.  We note that there is an asymmetric impact on the 
CAR, where the effect from positive earnings surprise (Panel B) is generally larger than that 
from negative earnings surprise (Panel C). Investors tend to react to positive earnings growth and 
surprise, by bidding up the stock price, more so than they would bid down a stock price in the 
event of negative earnings growth and surprise. The reluctance of investors to realize their losses 
reveal their greater disutility during negative earnings growth and surprise. These results are 
consistent with those of Shefrin and Statman (1985) that individual investors are reluctant to sell 
losers but are quick to bid up the stock price in the event of positive earnings surprise.  
 In Panel B of Table 5, we find that the square of an earnings surprise has a negative 
impact on CAR. This shows that the effect of positive earnings surprise. The effect of marginal 
positive earnings surprise diminishes as positive earnings surprise increases. Thus, investors are 
quick to realize their profits, as the utility of a large gain is not proportionately larger than the 
utility of a small profit. A larger earnings surprise does not result in a proportionately larger 
return. This finding is in line with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory, where the 
value function is concave for gains, where the marginal utility for an additional gain decreases. 
The relationship between the two-day CAR and earnings surprise is illustrated graphically in 
 
 
 
 
 15
Figure 4. The concave relation shows that investors are risk averse in gains and risk seeking in 
losses. Since the dissatisfaction from a large realized loss would not be much greater than the 
dissatisfaction from a smaller realized loss, investors would prefer not to realize their losses, in 
the hope that the stock price would recover. This occurs despite investors bearing the risk of 
losing even more as the stock price declines to adjust for a larger negative earnings surprise. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to examine how analysts and investors react to positive and 
negative events. We analyze the difference in forecast errors that analysts make during both 
positive and negative earnings growth periods and document the role that investor sentiment 
plays in the earnings expectation process. We compute and regress forecast errors on earnings 
growth, sentiment, and the number of analysts to determine their impact during periods of 
positive and negative earnings growth. An event study is also performed to examine the 
announcement effect of actual quarterly EPS under conditions of positive or negative growth, 
and positive or negative earnings surprise. The two-day announcement CAR is regressed on 
earnings growth, earnings surprise, and the number of analysts are run to establish the impact of 
these variables on stock returns during periods of positive and negative earnings surprise.   
Using explanations from prospect theory, we find that analysts make larger forecast 
errors during times of negative earnings growth than during positive ones. They have a tendency 
to over-estimate EPS during negative earnings growth periods. This indicates that they are either 
unable or unwilling to forecast an earnings decline. We document that market sentiment has a 
positive impact on forecast errors during times of negative earnings growth but no significant 
impact on forecast errors during positive ones. Strong sentiments cause analysts to be overly 
optimistic during negative earnings growth. This may explain the larger absolute forecast errors 
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during negative earnings growth periods compared to positive periods. Earnings surprise is found 
to have an asymmetric impact on returns. Increases in positive earnings surprise are associated 
with an increase in returns but increases in negative earnings surprise have only a slight impact 
on returns. The utility of a large gain is not proportionately larger than the utility of a small 
profit. This explains the tendency of investors to realize their profits early. The results of this 
study are consistent with the propositions of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory, 
where gains and losses have an asymmetric impact on the value of a prospect.   
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Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics for the Forecast Error Data Set 
This table provides summary statistics for the forecast error data set. Panel A provides the statistics for both groups.  In Panel B, 
the company’s actual quarterly EPS in the current quarter is equal or higher than its actual EPS in the previous quarter. In Panel 
C, the company’s actual quarterly EPS in the current quarter is lower than its actual EPS in the previous quarter. Panel D reports 
the mean differences of the variables between the positive and negative growth groups. Sentiment is the proportional change in 
the bullish respondents in the monthly AAII survey. The number of analysts refers to those that publish a forecast during a 
quarterly period for a company. Actual quarterly EPS is that announced by the company every quarter. Forecast quarterly EPS is 
the median one-quarter forward forecast of the next quarter’s actual EPS in the first available month. Forecast error is computed 
by subtracting the actual EPS from the forecasted EPS and then by the absolute value of the actual EPS. Earnings growth is 
computed by subtracting the reported actual EPS in the previous quarter from that reported in the current quarter. The difference 
is then divided by the absolute value of the reported actual EPS in the previous quarter. The levels of significance of 5%, 1%, and 
0.1% are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: All Observations (N = 45,488) 
Sentiment  0.0364 0.2293 -0.4214 0.7661 
Number of analysts 5.2456 4.4771 1.0000 40.0000 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.3231 1.9398 -144.8000 278.4600 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.3498 1.4852 -35.0000 222.7700 
Forecast Error 0.1637 0.6554 -0.9467 6.0000 
Earnings Growth 0.1945 1.0480 -4.6667 8.3333 
Panel B: Observations in Positive Earnings Growth Group (N = 27,891)  
Sentiment  0.0342 0.2258 -0.4214 0.7661 
Number of analysts 5.3555 4.5582 1.0000 40.0000 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.3844 2.0907 -56.0000 278.4600 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.3746 1.7889 -35.0000 222.7700 
Forecast Error 0.0292 0.4351 -0.9467 5.7778 
Earnings Growth 0.5989 1.0717 0.0000 8.3333 
Panel C: Observations in Negative Earnings Growth Group (N = 17,597) 
Sentiment  0.0398 0.2347 -0.4214 0.7661 
Number of analysts 5.0715 4.3400 1.0000 34.0000 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.2260 1.6685 -144.8000 100.2500 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.3105 0.7920 -18.0000 55.6900 
Forecast Error 0.3769 0.8580 -0.9315 6.0000 
Earnings Growth -0.4465 0.5902 -4.6667 -0.0063 
Panel D: Two-Sample T-Test of Difference Between Positive and Negative Earnings Growth Groups  
 Mean Difference t-Statistic 
Sentiment  -0.0056 -2.54* 
Number of analysts 0.2840 6.59*** 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.1584 8.49*** 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.0641 4.48*** 
Forecast Error -0.3477 -57.04*** 
Earnings Growtha 1.0454 17.28*** 
aThe difference in the absolute values is used. 
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Table 2 
 
Summary Statistics for the Earnings Surprise Data Set 
This table provides summary statistics for the earnings surprise data set. Panel A provides the statistics for all the observations. In 
Panel B, the company’s latest forecast quarterly EPS is lower than or equal to the actual quarterly EPS. In Panel C, the latest 
forecasted quarterly EPS is lower than the actual EPS. Panel D reports the mean differences of the variables between the positive 
and negative earnings surprise groups. The number of analysts captures those that publish a forecast during a quarterly period for 
a company. Actual quarterly EPS is the quarterly EPS announced by the company every quarter. Forecast quarterly EPS is the 
median forecast of the next quarter’s actual EPS one month prior to the month of the announcement of the actual EPS. Earnings 
surprise is computed by subtracting the forecasted quarterly EPS from the actual quarterly EPS, and then dividing by the absolute 
value of the forecasted quarterly EPS. Earnings growth is computed by subtracting the reported actual EPS in the previous 
quarter from the reported actual EPS in the current quarter. This difference is then divided by the absolute value of the reported 
actual EPS in the previous quarter. The levels of significance of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are represented by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: All Observations (N = 50,150) 
Number of analysts  6.5011 5.2923 1.0000 42.0000 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.3193 1.9305 -162.5000 278.4600 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.3261 1.5532 -111.3800 178.2100 
Earnings Surprise -0.0182 0.4452 -4.0000 2.0000 
Earnings Growth 0.1888 1.0458 -5.0000 8.3333 
Panel B: Observations in Positive Earnings Surprise Group (N = 33,479) 
Number of analysts  6.8225 5.4007 1.0000 38.0000 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.3637 1.8791 -37.0000 278.4600 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.3197 1.4333 -50.0000 178.2100 
Earnings Surprise 0.1430 0.2604 0.0000 2.0000 
Earnings Growth 0.3034 1.0040 -5.0000 8.3333 
Panel C: Observations in Negative Earnings Surprise Group (N = 16, 671) 
Number of analysts  5.8556 5.0058 1.0000 42.0000 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.2302 2.0268 -162.5000 77.9700 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) 0.3391 1.7697 -111.3800 133.6600 
Earnings Surprise -0.3418 0.5508 -4.0000 -0.0040 
Earnings Growth -0.0413 1.0895 -5.0000 8.3333 
Panel D: Two-Sample T-Test of Difference Between Positive and Negative Earnings Surprise Groups  
 Mean Difference t-Statistic 
Number of analysts  0.9669 19.35*** 
Actual quarterly EPS ($) 0.1335 7.30*** 
Forecast quarterly EPS ($) -0.0194 -1.32 
Earnings Surprisea -0.1988 -54.57*** 
Earnings Growth 0.3447 35.20*** 
aThe difference in the absolute values is used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
Table 3 
 
Regression Results of Forecast Error 
This table shows the regressions results of the forecast error (FE) on earnings growth (EG), investor sentiment (S), and the 
number of analysts (N): ti,31-t2ti,10ti, NbSbEGbbFE +++= . T-statistics are in parentheses. The levels of significance of 5%, 
1%, and 0.1% are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
Model (b0) EG (b1) S (b2) N (b3) F-Statistic R2 
Panel A: All Observations (N = 45,488) 
1 0.1925 
(63.40***) 
-0.1481 
(-51.97***) 
- - 2700.47*** 0.0560 
2 0.1911 
(62.19***) 
-0.1481 
(-51.97***) 
0.0383 
(2.94**) 
- 1354.79*** 0.0562 
3 0.2345 
(50.61***) 
-0.1488 
(-52.29***) 
- -0.0080 
(-11.99***) 
1426.3*** 0.0590 
4 0.2331 
(50.04***) 
-0.1488 
(-52.29***) 
0.0381 
(2.93**) 
-0.0080 
(-11.98***) 
953.89*** 0.0592 
Panel B: Observations in the Positive Growth Group (N = 27,891) 
1 0.0289 
(9.68***) 
0.00055 
(0.23) 
- - 0.05 0.0000 
2 0.0292 
(9.71***) 
0.00058 
(0.24) 
-0.0095 
(-0.82) 
- 0.36 0.0000 
3 0.0428 
(9.79***) 
-0.00039 
(-0.16) 
- -0.0025 
(-4.36***) 
9.51*** 0.0007 
4 0.0432 
(9.82***) 
-0.00036 
(-0.15) 
-0.0094 
(-0.82) 
-0.0025 
(-4.35***) 
6.56*** 0.0007 
Panel C: Observations in the Negative Growth Group (N = 17,597) 
1 0.1225 
(16.42***) 
-0.5698 
(-56.51***) 
- - 3193.36*** 0.1536 
2 0.1199 
(15.94***) 
-0.5695 
(-56.48***) 
0.0690 
(2.72**) 
- 1600.96*** 0.1540 
3 0.1484 
(14.10***) 
-0.5663 
(-55.91***) 
- -0.0048 
(-3.49***) 
1603.79*** 0.1542 
4 0.1458 
(13.79***) 
-0.5660 
(-55.88***) 
0.0688 
(2.71**) 
-0.0048 
(-3.49***) 
1072.03*** 0.1546 
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Table 4 
 
Abnormal Returns 
This table shows the event study results of earnings growth and surprises from days -15 through 15, where day 0 represents the 
date of announcement of quarterly EPS. Panel A reports the daily abnormal returns, which are derived from the deviations from 
the single factor market model. The cumulative abnormal returns for various aggregations periods are presented in Panel B. T-
statistics are in parentheses. The levels of significance of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Day Positive Growth Negative Growth Positive Earnings Surprise Negative Earnings Surprise 
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns 
-15 0.00% (-0.389) -0.03% (-2.621**) 0.00% (-0.291) -0.04% (-2.983**) 
-14 0.00% (-0.855) -0.07% (-5.328***) -0.02% (-2.322*) -0.05% (-3.668***) 
-13 -0.03% (-3.246**) -0.06% (-5.597***) -0.02% (-3.045**) -0.09% (-6.186***) 
-12 -0.05% (-4.551***) -0.05% (-3.716***) -0.04% (-3.605***) -0.07% (-5.104***) 
-11 -0.01% (-1.379) -0.02% (-2.554*) 0.01% (-0.696) -0.05% (-3.678***) 
-10 0.01% (0.673) -0.01% (-1.989*) 0.02% (1.157) -0.03% (-2.920**) 
-9 -0.02% (-1.945) -0.07% (-5.470***) -0.01% (-2.082*) -0.09% (-5.655***) 
-8 -0.02% (-1.531) -0.06% (-4.599***) 0.01% (-0.372) -0.13% (-6.591***) 
-7 0.00% (-0.543) -0.04% (-2.545*) 0.01% (0.487) -0.07% (-4.226***) 
-6 0.01% (1.200) -0.04% (-2.894**) 0.01% (1.259) -0.06% (-3.339***) 
-5 0.00% (-0.392) -0.02% (-1.440) 0.00% (0.432) -0.03% (-2.731**) 
-4 -0.01% (-1.409) -0.07% (-5.579***) -0.01% (-1.730) -0.08% (-5.547***) 
-3 0.00% (-0.840) -0.01% (-1.773) 0.03% (1.063) -0.06% (-4.613***) 
-2 0.09% (4.950***) -0.01% (-2.164*) 0.11% (7.042***) -0.07% (-5.722***) 
-1 0.20% (13.366***) -0.03% (-2.619**) 0.23% (16.850***) -0.14% (-8.817***) 
0 0.45% (33.496***) -0.13% (-9.599***) 0.60% (47.685***) -0.55% (-33.251***) 
1 0.13% (10.895***) -0.17% (-9.366***) 0.18% (16.513***) -0.33% (-19.091***) 
2 0.00% (0.969) -0.01% (-1.265) -0.01% (1.443) 0.00% (-2.134*) 
3 -0.03% (-0.669) -0.06% (-2.789**) -0.03% (-0.386) -0.05% (-3.412***) 
4 0.02% (2.424*) -0.02% (-0.788) 0.01% (2.450*) -0.01% (-1.072) 
5 0.02% (2.316*) 0.00% (-0.503) 0.02% (3.058**) -0.01% (-1.781) 
6 -0.01% (0.645) -0.03% (-1.529) -0.02% (-0.073) -0.01% (-0.689) 
7 -0.01% (-0.613) -0.03% (-1.786) -0.01% (-0.751) -0.03% (-1.713) 
8 0.02% (1.444) -0.01% (-1.921) 0.01% (1.241) 0.00% (-1.914) 
9 0.00% (0.818) 0.00% (-0.076) 0.00% (0.868) -0.01% (-0.214) 
10 0.02% (1.462) 0.01% (0.165) 0.02% (2.000*) 0.01% (-0.696) 
11 0.01% (1.422) -0.02% (-2.307*) 0.02% (1.964*) -0.05% (-3.405***) 
12 -0.02% (-1.120) -0.03% (-1.677) -0.01% (-0.816) -0.05% (-2.193*) 
13 -0.02% (-1.852) 0.03% (2.430*) -0.01% (-1.158) 0.03% (1.796) 
14 0.00% (0.809) 0.00% (0.168) 0.00% (0.496) 0.01% (0.576) 
15 0.03% (2.306*) 0.03% (1.349) 0.03% (2.411*) 0.02% (1.162) 
Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(-15,0) 0.63% (9.151***) 0.73% (-15.121***) 0.93% (15.458***) -1.61% (-26.258***) 
(-10,0) 0.72% (14.178***) -0.50% (-12.262***) 1.00% (21.646***) -1.32% (-25.150***) 
(-5,0) 0.73% (20.074***) -0.27% (-9.460***) 0.96% (29.125***) -0.94% (-24.773***) 
(-4,0) 0.73% (22.165***) -0.25% (-9.720***) 0.96% (31.712***) -0.90% (-25.916***) 
(-3,0) 0.74% (25.487***) -0.18% (-8.077***) 0.96% (36.320***) -0.82% (-26.202***) 
(-2,0) 0.74% (29.914***) -0.17% (-8.303***) 0.93% (41.325***) -0.76% (-27.591***) 
(-1,0) 0.65% (33.136***) -0.16% (-8.639***) 0.82% (45.633***) -0.68% (-29.747***) 
(-1,+1) 0.78% (33.346***) -0.33% (-12.462***) 1.00% (29.125***) -1.02% (-35.310***) 
(0,+1) 0.58% (31.389***) -0.30% (-13.410***) 0.77% (45.395***) -0.88% (-37.011***) 
(0,+2) 0.58% (26.188***) -0.32% (-11.679***) 0.76% (37.898***) -0.88% (-31.452***) 
(0,+3) 0.55% (22.346***) -0.38% (-11.509***) 0.73% (32.628***) -0.93% (-28.944***) 
(0,+4) 0.57% (21.071***) -0.40% (-10.646***) 0.74% (30.279***) -0.95% (-26.368***) 
(0,+5) 0.59% (20.180***) -0.40% (-9.924***) 0.76% (28.889***) -0.95% (-24.797***) 
(0,+10) 0.60% (16.037***) -0.45% (-8.881***) 0.77% (22.327***) -1.00% (-19.890***) 
(0,+15) 0.61% (13.688***) -0.44% (-7.373***) 0.79% (19.237***) -1.03% (-17.008***) 
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Table 5 
 
Regression Results of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table shows the results the regression of the two-day CAR on earnings growth, earnings surprise, the square of earnings 
surprise, and the number of analysts following a company: Ti,4
2
Ti,3Ti,2Ti,10Ti, .Nb).(ESb.ESb.EGbbCAR(0,1) ++++=  
where CAR(0,1) represents the two-day CAR in reaction to the EPS announcement; EG is the earnings growth; ES is the 
earnings surprise; N is the number of analysts for the ith stock; and the bi’s are the coefficient estimates of the regression. T-
statistics are in parentheses. The levels of significance of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Model (b0) EG (b1) ES (b2) ES2 (b3) N (b4) F-Statistic R2 
Panel A: All Observations (N = 42,431) 
1 0.0017 
(6.78***) 
0.0033 
(13.80***) 
- - - 190.50*** 0.0045 
2 0.0015 
(6.06***) 
0.0016 
(6.72***) 
0.0180 
(25.94***) 
0.0038 
(12.18***) 
- 290.26*** 0.0201 
3 0.0021 
(5.39***) 
0.0032 
(13.77***) 
- - -0.000067 
(-1.43) 
96.27*** 0.0045 
4 0.0020 
(4.86***) 
0.0016 
(6.67***) 
0.0180 
(25.92***) 
0.0037 
(12.05***) 
-0.000061 
(-1.32) 
218.13*** 0.0202 
Panel B: Observations in the Positive Earnings Surprise Group (N = 28,541) 
1 0.0070 
(22.95***) 
0.0025 
(8.49***) 
- - - 72.10*** 0.0025 
2 0.0026 
(6.82***) 
0.0016 
(5.33***) 
0.0483 
(18.55***) 
-0.0248 
(-13.31***) 
- 158.91*** 0.0164 
3 0.0081 
(16.69***) 
0.0024 
(8.32***) 
- - -0.00016 
(-2.91**) 
40.28*** 0.0028 
4 0.0023 
(4.02***) 
0.0016 
(5.34***) 
0.0486 
(18.43***) 
-0.0249 
(-13.31***) 
0.000039 
(0.70) 
119.31*** 0.0164 
Panel C: Observations in the Negative Earnings Surprise Group (N = 13, 890) 
1 -0.0088 
(-19.97***) 
0.0017 
(4.17***) 
- - - 17.37*** 0.0012 
2 -0.0079 
(-12.66***) 
0.0014 
(3.25**) 
0.0036 
(1.72) 
0.00086 
(1.22) 
- 7.00*** 0.0015 
3 -0.0074 
(-10.85***) 
0.0017 
(4.19***) 
- - -0.00023 
(-2.57*) 
12.00*** 0.0017 
4 -0.0061 
(-6.96***) 
0.0013 
(3.09**) 
0.0046 
(2.18*) 
0.0011 
(1.56) 
-0.00026 
(-2.97**) 
7.46*** 0.0021 
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Figure 1 
 
Value Function of Prospect Theory 
The figure illustrates the value function of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory. We 
evaluate gains and losses starting from the current state of wealth. The function has a gentle 
slope for gains and a steeper slope for losses, implying that investors would suffer a greater 
disutility in losses than they would enjoy utility from a gain of the same absolute magnitude. 
Moreover, the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses. 
 
Value
GainsLosses
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Figure 2 
 
Actual EPS, Forecasted EPS, and Earnings Growth 
This figure illustrates the relationship between actual EPS, forecasted EPS, and earnings growth. 
The vertical line represents the scenario of zero earnings growth, when a company’s actual EPS 
in the current quarter is exactly the same as that in the previous quarter. The diagonal line in 
bold, named Actual EPS, represents all possible cases for the actual EPS in the current quarter. 
The intersection of the vertical line and the Actual EPS line represents the point where the actual 
EPS of the company in the current quarter is the same as that in the previous quarter. The dashed 
diagonal line, named Forecast EPS, represents forecasted EPS in the current quarter. The 
Forecast EPS line is kinked at the point of zero earnings growth and then overlaps that of the 
Actual EPS line.  This illustrates the way analysts make greater forecast errors during periods of 
negative earnings growth than positive ones. 
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Figure 3 
 
Plots of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The plot of the CAR from 30 days before earnings announcement date to 30 days after the 
earnings announcement date is shown for announcements occurring during (a) positive growth, 
(b) negative growth, (c) positive earnings surprise, and (d) negative earnings surprise. Day 0 
represents the date of the announcement. 
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Figure 4 
 
Earnings Surprise and Two-day CAR 
The figure depicts the relationship between earnings surprise and the two-day announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns. The slope is concave during positive earnings surprise, indicating 
that any further increases in earnings surprise would generate smaller increases in abnormal 
returns. Increases in negative earnings surprise have only a slight impact on returns, as indicated 
by the gentler slope. This indicates that investors are reluctant to take losses in the event of 
negative earnings surprise as they appear to suffer a greater disutility in losses. 
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